Iran does not offer enrichment cessation or significant nuclear-program downgrade in any proposal by Jun 1
Reasoning
R005 (post-IRGC Iran is a category error) and R010 (Two Saboteurs / Deal After the Deal) both argue this is structurally impossible given Iran's institutional configuration. The May 1 proposal explicitly decoupled nuclear; this is the IRGC-acceptable subset of foreign-ministry preference. Pezeshkian/Araghchi cannot offer what they do not control. Mojtaba 64 days unseen makes a Supreme-Leader override structurally unavailable. The 440kg of 60% enriched uranium at Isfahan is the IRGC's institutional trophy. The decoupling-rejection cycle from May 1 publishes the war's actual demand surface as undeliverable through the negotiating channel.
Resolution
The two halves split: enrichment cessation was never offered (frozen and deferred, rights preserved), while the HEU down-blend commitment trips the "downgrade" half only as a reciprocal term of a comprehensive JCPOA-2.0. The prediction described the non-deal status quo; a deal materialised.