A. US-imposed halt Trump declares objectives met and draws down. No formal ceasefire. Hormuz stays contested. Iran claims survival as victory.
B. Negotiated ceasefire Third-party mediation brokers a deal. Requires both sides claiming they won. Trust near zero after attacking during negotiations.
C. Grinding attrition / ground ops No decisive outcome. Reduced strikes, proxy attacks, Hormuz contested. Absorbed former Scenario F (protracted conflict) from Session 7 onward. Later reframed to include limited ground operations (Isfahan raid, Kharg).
D. Regional expansion War widens beyond current belligerents. Houthis, Gulf states, or NATO members drawn in as active combatants.
E. Regime collapse Internal fractures topple the Islamic Republic. Historically rare from bombing alone. IRGC military rule the most likely successor.
F. Protracted conflict Neither victory nor collapse. Ongoing strikes, contested Hormuz, proxy attacks. The default if nothing decisive happens. Absorbed into Scenario C from Session 7.
G. Infrastructure war spiral Both sides target civilian infrastructure - power, water, telecoms. Introduced after Trump's power plant ultimatum. Collapsed when he backed down (TACO).
H. Ceasefire collapse / Phase 2 Ceasefire breaks down, war resumes at higher intensity with full US force package in position. Introduced Session 012 after 2-week ceasefire.
Down from 32%. The kinetic-victory route is constrained by Saudi/Kuwait airspace denial. Project Freedom could not run without Prince Sultan Airbase. The MoU framework drafted via mediators is now the operative route to a Trump victory declaration - but the negotiating track has not landed terms. A remains the most likely managed-exit scenario if the summit produces a frame the foreign-ministry track can use.
B. Negotiated ceasefire
40%
Up from 18%. B1 (genuine negotiated settlement) rises to 0.10 from 0.03: the 14-point MoU framework is on the table; Iran's foreign-ministry track is negotiating in good faith via Pakistan and Qatar; the Trump-Xi summit may produce the frame that lets the deal land. B2 (frozen-conflict extension) rises to 0.30 from 0.15: the two-track architecture (kinetic + diplomatic, both publicly maintained) proved structurally stable across May 4 - 5 events and is now the modal medium-term outcome. The MoU-without-IRGC-buy-in path leads to B2 by default.
C. Grinding attrition / ground ops
10%
Down from 25%. Two structural facts collapse C. First, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait denied US airspace and base access for Project Freedom on May 4 - 5; MBS personally rejected Trump's request. The basing the Isfahan raid required is not available without Gulf-state acquiescence the Gulf states are demonstrably withholding. Second, P053 (Iran nuclear escalation by May 13) is expiring with Iran having moved opposite direction - offering an enrichment moratorium and HEU transfer through mediators rather than escalating. The chain is broken at step 4.
Down 1 point. The Pezeshkian-IRGC split is now public on the front page; Iran's denials confirm the rift is operationally visible. The split is institutional reconfiguration, not regime collapse - R005's structural claim that the IRGC IS the regime's coercive substrate holds. The foreign-ministry track may collapse; the regime does not.
Down from 12%. Iran's kinetic envelope held inside the May 4 - 5 window through May 11; no further Gulf-state territory strikes; the Houthis still quiet. Gulf states are actively constraining US escalation, which constrains the spiral path even if Iran were to expand the envelope. Lebanon producing 40-dead days but contained within the truce-extension architecture.
H. Ceasefire collapse / Phase 2
8%
Unchanged. The hostilities-have-terminated framework continues to suppress formal ceasefire collapse. Trump's May 11 'massive life support' rhetoric softens the framing but does not retract the May 1 legal predicate. The fiction remains load-bearing for War Powers cover and the negotiating track.
Session 17Three days to Beijing. The Trump-Xi summit confirmed for May 14 - 15 is the gating event the war has been moving toward since the April 7 ceasefire. The pre-summit week produced the table: the 14-point MoU framework leaked May 6 (Iran enrichment moratorium 5 - 20 year range, HEU transfer to a third country, no underground facilities, snap inspections; US lifts sanctions, releases frozen funds, opens Hormuz); Iran's May 10 counter-proposal punting on nuclear and demanding Hormuz sovereignty, $270B reparations, and end of fighting on all fronts including Lebanon; Trump's same-day rejection ('totally unacceptable'). S016 corrigendum: Trump's May 5 Project Freedom pause was operationally driven by Saudi and Kuwaiti denial of US airspace and Prince Sultan Airbase, not the ceasefire fiction; R004 ([Doomed Alignment](/rumination/doomed-alignment)) in operational form. The Pezeshkian-IRGC split is now public; the MoU is being negotiated by a faction that may not control the spoilers. Force posture contracted: USS Ford transited Gibraltar westbound May 6 after 322 days; Rubio declared Operation Epic Fury concluded. Iran storage 15 days from shut-in; Kharg leaked 80,000 barrels May 5 - 8. Three summit states: Iran frame produced (~20%), bilateral frame Iran sidesteps (~55%), summit fails (~25%). Framework confidence holds at 0.55.
Per-scenario reasoning
A28%Down from 32%. The kinetic-victory route is constrained by Saudi/Kuwait airspace denial. Project Freedom could not run without Prince Sultan Airbase. The MoU framework drafted via mediators is now the operative route to a Trump victory declaration - but the negotiating track has not landed terms. A remains the most likely managed-exit scenario if the summit produces a frame the foreign-ministry track can use.
B40%Up from 18%. B1 (genuine negotiated settlement) rises to 0.10 from 0.03: the 14-point MoU framework is on the table; Iran's foreign-ministry track is negotiating in good faith via Pakistan and Qatar; the Trump-Xi summit may produce the frame that lets the deal land. B2 (frozen-conflict extension) rises to 0.30 from 0.15: the two-track architecture (kinetic + diplomatic, both publicly maintained) proved structurally stable across May 4 - 5 events and is now the modal medium-term outcome. The MoU-without-IRGC-buy-in path leads to B2 by default.
C10%Down from 25%. Two structural facts collapse C. First, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait denied US airspace and base access for Project Freedom on May 4 - 5; MBS personally rejected Trump's request. The basing the Isfahan raid required is not available without Gulf-state acquiescence the Gulf states are demonstrably withholding. Second, P053 (Iran nuclear escalation by May 13) is expiring with Iran having moved opposite direction - offering an enrichment moratorium and HEU transfer through mediators rather than escalating. The chain is broken at step 4.
D4%Down 1 point. The Pezeshkian-IRGC split is now public on the front page; Iran's denials confirm the rift is operationally visible. The split is institutional reconfiguration, not regime collapse - R005's structural claim that the IRGC IS the regime's coercive substrate holds. The foreign-ministry track may collapse; the regime does not.
E10%Down from 12%. Iran's kinetic envelope held inside the May 4 - 5 window through May 11; no further Gulf-state territory strikes; the Houthis still quiet. Gulf states are actively constraining US escalation, which constrains the spiral path even if Iran were to expand the envelope. Lebanon producing 40-dead days but contained within the truce-extension architecture.
H8%Unchanged. The hostilities-have-terminated framework continues to suppress formal ceasefire collapse. Trump's May 11 'massive life support' rhetoric softens the framing but does not retract the May 1 legal predicate. The fiction remains load-bearing for War Powers cover and the negotiating track.
Session 16The week the war's structural facts came forward unguarded. The 60-day War Powers deadline expired May 1 with the Senate failing 6/6 attempts to enforce it; Trump's letter to Congress claimed the hostilities have terminated as the legal predicate. The same day Iran sent the United States a peace proposal offering everything except the nuclear program; Trump rejected on nuclear specifically. The decoupling and the rejection together publish the war's actual demand surface: enrichment cessation, undeliverable through the negotiating track per R005 and R010. China invoked its blocking statute for the first time on May 2 - structural counter-power rather than retaliation, adding a qualitatively new rung to the economic Kahn ladder. Lebanon strikes killed 41 in 24 hours despite Trump's April 29 surgical-only instruction. The Provocation Architecture (R011) is now visible at production volume. P049 expired (Houthi over-prediction, third or fourth iteration of the directional error). The IRGC-withholding hypothesis is being confirmed in real time - Iran moved opposite the Isfahan chain's predicted direction by offering to take nuclear off the immediate table. The frozen extension that B2 names is what the May 1 letter constructs as operative US legal posture; its lifespan is bounded by the force-sustainment ceiling for three CSGs and Iran's storage saturation deadline in May. Framework confidence rises from 0.50 to 0.55.
Per-scenario reasoning
A32%Up from 30%. The May 1 letter to Congress declaring hostilities terminated is a soft victory claim entered in writing. The blockade and sanctions cascade run on autopilot beneath it. The legal posture and the operational posture both lean toward a managed exit at a moment of US choosing rather than at a moment of Iranian forcing. Force-sustainment ceiling caps the lifespan inside 30-60 days.
B18%B1 (genuine negotiated settlement) falls to 0.03 from 0.05. Iran sent a peace proposal May 1 offering everything except enrichment cessation; Trump rejected on enrichment specifically. The proposal/rejection cycle publishes the war's actual demand surface as undeliverable through the negotiating track. R005 and R010 are now empirically operative. B2 (frozen-conflict extension) rises to 0.15 from 0.10. The May 1 letter actively constructs B2 as the operative US legal posture - not as transition to something else but as the end state the administration now has incentive to preserve. B2 lifespan bounded by the force-sustainment ceiling and Iran storage saturation.
C25%Down from 30%. P053 (Iran nuclear escalation by May 13) is moving against us. Iran offered to take nuclear off the immediate table on May 1 rather than escalate it - consistent with the IRGC reading the Isfahan chain accurately and withholding. If P053 expires, the chain is broken at step 4 and the kinetic-resolution path through Iranian provocation no longer self-executes. C remains live medium-term because only the Isfahan chain can deliver enrichment cessation given that the negotiating track has been demonstrated foreclosed.
D5%Unchanged. Mojtaba unseen for 64 days. Iran is governing through IRGC institutional substrate per R005. Internal collapse remains structurally contained.
E12%Up from 10%. China invoked its blocking statute on May 2 - first operational use since 2021 - against five Chinese refineries the US sanctioned. The instrument is structural rather than retaliatory but adds a qualitatively new rung to the economic Kahn ladder. Lebanon strikes killed 41 in 24 hours on May 2 despite Trump's April 29 instruction to Netanyahu for surgical-only operations. Both shifts contain wider-war potential without yet realising it.
H8%Down from 10%. The hostilities-have-terminated framework actively suppresses formal collapse. Both sides retain incentive to leave the ceasefire informally broken rather than declaratively dead. The fiction is now load-bearing for War Powers cover, and the administration that constructed it will resist anything that requires walking it back.
Session 15The session's central thesis is that quiet periods at a news cycle low - with public attention fatigue set in - are precisely when the most controversial and structurally consequential moves can happen without scrutiny. The week catalogues the pattern: Hengli sanctions weeks before a Trump-Xi meeting, Truth Social blockade-scope expansion, named two-star forward at the head of a division command apparatus, and a Supreme Leader unseen for 54 days, all generating no sustained discourse. Underneath the surface quiet, the force package substantially completed (Boxer arriving), the secondary sanctions cascade started faster than predicted (P051 + P056 both confirmed in 11 days against a 60-day window), the Iranian factional split became operative US framing (Trump's 'unified proposal' construction publicly states what R010 was about to argue), and the news cycle cooled while operational tempo did not. Scenario B was structurally miscategorized - Iran is not negotiating, it is structurally unable to. B is split into B1 (genuine settlement, 0.05) and B2 (frozen-conflict extension, 0.10 NEW) to capture what is actually happening. A rises 5 points on force package convergence and the cascade running on autopilot. H drops 5 points on Trump's revealed preference for the ceasefire fiction. The Isfahan chain thesis holds; P053 (nuclear escalation by May 13) remains the pivot.
Per-scenario reasoning
A30%Up from 25%. Force package substantially complete - USS Boxer + 11th MEU arriving Apr 23-28 alongside the 82nd Airborne division HQ + 1st BCT under Maj Gen Tegtmeier. Cascade running early (Hengli sanctions Apr 24). Structural pressure compounding. Isfahan chain remains the cleanest exit ramp.
C30%Flat at 30%. Force package now exceeds the original Isfahan raid sizing - three readings live (raid plus distractions plus redundancy; expanded operation; political-contingency overmatch). Political authorization remains the only constraint. Conditional on P053 nuclear trigger.
B15%Flat in aggregate but structurally repositioned. B1 (genuine negotiated settlement) drops to 0.05 because Iran is structurally unable to deliver - the IRGC controls the nuclear material the foreign ministry would have to bargain with, and Araghchi cannot offer what he does not own. B2 (frozen-conflict extension - indefinite ceasefire, hardening blockade, sanctions cascade, no Iranian counter-offer arriving) is added at 0.10 to capture the modal 30-day outcome the original B framing was mis-classifying. B2 resolves through nuclear escalation (toward C/A), internal Iranian fracture (toward B1 or D), or asymmetric Iranian response (toward H).
H10%Down from 15%. Trump's indefinite ceasefire extension on Apr 21 reveals that the ceasefire fiction has political utility worth preserving. An administration pointed at collapse would do the opposite. Both sides find informal breakdown more useful than formal rupture.
E10%Flat at 10%. Lebanon equilibrium settled into low-intensity attrition under the self-defence clause. Houthi under-performance continued (P049 expected to expire Apr 27). Iran disinclined toward horizontal expansion - the Gulf strikes from earlier in the war already activated the Kushner ceasefire lobby.
D5%Unchanged. Iran's institutional coherence holding through 58 days of war despite Mojtaba's 54-day public absence and visible IRGC seizure of wartime decision authority. The Guard succession is the regime succession; the regime is not collapsing, it is consolidating around its hardest core.
Session 14Slight rebalancing. B (negotiated ceasefire) ticks up for the first time since the Islamabad collapse - talks haven't died, Lebanon ceasefire shows Trump can extract concessions from allies, Iran studying proposals rather than rejecting outright. C dips to offset. The Isfahan chain thesis holds but Monday is a genuine fork: if talks produce a framework and the ceasefire extends, B rises substantially and C drops. If talks fail and the ceasefire expires, H activates and the chain resumes.
Per-scenario reasoning
C30%Down slightly from 35%. Isfahan chain thesis intact but diplomatic track is more alive than expected. If Monday talks produce a framework, C drops further. Boxer arriving - force package now complete.
A25%Stable. Still merging with C via Isfahan chain. Lebanon ceasefire gives Trump a visible win, but standalone exit without ground ops remains unlikely.
H15%Stable. Ceasefire disintegrating (Hormuz re-closure, gunboat fire) but neither side has formally killed it. Monday is the fork - talks or collapse.
B15%Up from 10%. First increase since S012. Talks not dead - Lebanon ceasefire shows Trump can deal, Iran studying fresh proposals, second round Monday. But blockade fundamentally incompatible with good-faith negotiation.
E10%Stable. Tanker fire and Hormuz re-closure are escalatory but contained. Neither the US nor China seeking confrontation. Blockade hasn't triggered wider conflict.
D5%Unchanged. Iran's institutional coherence holding through 51 days of war, ceasefire, blockade, and Hormuz whiplash.
Session 13The Isfahan Chain reshapes the scenario landscape. Scenarios A (exit) and C (ground ops) are converging: the Isfahan raid IS the exit. The blockade is the forcing function that removes Iran's Hormuz leverage, leaving nuclear escalation as Iran's only remaining card - which is exactly what legitimizes the operation the force was positioned for. Scenario B collapsed after Islamabad talks failed. The ceasefire is collapsing in real time. Trajectory confidence rises to 0.50 - the blockade clarifies the endgame even if it doesn't resolve it. First session using prediction chains and board state check.
Per-scenario reasoning
C35%Up from 20%. The Isfahan Chain: blockade removes Hormuz leverage, forces nuclear escalation, legitimizes the raid the force was positioned for. A and C are converging - the raid IS the exit. 160th SOAR, 82nd Airborne, two MEUs, 112 C-17s all in position.
H25%Up from 10%. Ceasefire collapsing in real time. Blockade is incompatible with ceasefire. Iran calling it piracy. CENTCOM calls it 'a pause.' If ceasefire collapses without nuclear escalation, war resumes with full force in position.
A15%Merging with C via Isfahan chain. The raid is the cleanest exit - snatch the uranium, declare 'denuclearization achieved,' leave. Standalone Mission Accomplished without ground ops is fading.
B10%Steep drop from 30%. Islamabad talks failed at the highest level. Blockade active. No second round scheduled. Iran has no leverage left to negotiate with except the nuclear card - and playing it triggers the raid, not negotiations.
D10%Up from 5%. Blockade risks Chinese confrontation over oil supply. Houthi Bab al-Mandeb threat. Pakistan deployed 13,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. But neither the US nor China wants escalation.
E5%Unchanged. Iran's institutional coherence held through 46 days of war, a ceasefire, failed talks, and now a blockade. The IRGC adapts; it doesn't collapse.
Session 12The ceasefire reshuffles everything. Scenario B (negotiated ceasefire) rises to lead position for the first time - the framework exists and talks are scheduled. But the ceasefire admits three readings we cannot yet distinguish: (1) genuine exit ramp, (2) stall for force buildup - ceasefire window perfectly matches carrier/MEU arrival timelines, (3) Israeli sabotage target - Netanyahu already carving exceptions. The Islamabad talks on Apr 10 are the first data point. Our trajectory confidence is the lowest in the project's history (0.30) because we've moved from a pattern-dominated phase (where we're strong) to a decision-dominated phase (where we suck).
Per-scenario reasoning
B30%Up from 20%. Two-week ceasefire declared. Islamabad talks Apr 10. Pakistan brokered directly. Framework exists. But Iran's 10-point plan and US demands are structurally incompatible, and Israeli sabotage already begun (Lebanon carve-out).
H25%NEW. Absorbs most of former Scenario A. Ceasefire collapses - missiles still flying the morning after, Netanyahu carved Lebanon out within hours, Iran enters talks with 'complete distrust.' Full US force package arrives during the 2-week window. If talks fail, war resumes at higher intensity.
C20%Down from 30%. Ceasefire pauses ground ops authorization. F-15 rescue showed ground operations are exponentially harder than planned. BUT force still converging - ceasefire window perfectly aligns with force buildup timeline.
A10%Down sharply from 25%. The clean exit where Trump's 'total victory' sticks and the ceasefire holds. Missiles still flying the morning after makes this less likely by the hour.
D5%Down from 10%. Ceasefire provides off-ramp. Coordinated attacks demonstrated but paused.
E5%Unchanged. Iran negotiating from strength. Institutional cohesion holding despite massive infrastructure destruction.
G5%Back from the dead. Human chains killed the US version, but Iran is still hitting Gulf petrochemical infrastructure during the 'ceasefire.' The spiral may be one-directional.
Session 11The alliance contradiction is now the war's central analytical problem. Israel is openly sabotaging US diplomacy (5 for 5 pattern). Ground op type determines endgame: Isfahan raid → Scenario A exit; Kharg/Strait → grinding commitment. Gulf interceptor depletion (Bahrain 87%) creates a structural time limit on the current equilibrium. China and UK-led coalitions entering the picture signal that the post-war order will not be American-directed.
Per-scenario reasoning
A35%Up from 30%. Trump's primetime exit narrative + Isfahan raid pathway (snatch fissiles, declare victory, leave) favors this. But the alliance contradiction means Israel escalates during any wind-down, complicating a clean exit.
C30%Unchanged. Three-carrier convergence ~Apr 10-12. Ground op TYPE matters: Isfahan raid feeds Scenario A; Kharg/Strait occupation feeds grinding attrition. Force is configured for a raid, not an occupation.
B20%Unchanged. China-Pakistan five-point plan adds great-power-backed framework. But Israel has sabotaged 5 of 5 diplomatic windows. Any ceasefire must bypass or override Israel - unprecedented.
D10%Down from 15%. Houthis operational (3 strikes) but coordinated with Iran, not freelancing. Gulf states conducting independent ISR but not entering as belligerents. 40-nation coalition is diplomatic, not military.
E5%Down. Three-axis coordination demonstrates operational capability, not institutional collapse. NPT bill submitted shows functioning governance.
Session 10Scenario G (infrastructure war spiral) holds at 5% - Trump has backed down three times but the threat isn't withdrawn, and Israel is hitting grid/industrial targets independently. The dominant dynamic is the conditioning-capability gap: the ground phase is being publicly sold on a timeline the logistics don't support. Mid-April is the earliest convergence window. The race between conditioning and diplomacy is the new central tension.
Per-scenario reasoning
C30%Up from 25%. Pentagon publicly preparing 'weeks of limited ground operations.' Levin broadcast conditioning public. 3,500 Marines in theater. But force posture not ready yet - Boxer weeks away, 82nd not confirmed, Ford in Greece. Mid-April convergence window.
A30%Down from 35%. You can't sell a victory withdrawal while simultaneously selling ground operations. Rubio's 'conclude within weeks' could mean ground ops then exit, not exit without ground ops.
B20%Unchanged. Islamabad Quad talks are real diplomatic progress - Hormuz consortium proposal, Rubio-Araghchi face-to-face being discussed. But simultaneous ground ops conditioning and NPT withdrawal legislation poison the well from both sides.
D10%Unchanged from S009. Houthis launched 2 attacks in 1 day with Bab al-Mandeb closure threatened. PSAB devastation shows Iran's deep-strike reach. But Houthi follow-through is uncertain - see the moratorium.
E5%Unchanged. NPT withdrawal legislation actually shows institutional cohesion - parliament is functioning and legislating, not fracturing.
G5%Down from 10% but not dead. Trump has TACOed three times on power plants but the threat isn't formally withdrawn. Israel continues hitting industrial and grid targets independently - Tehran partial blackout, steel plants destroyed.
Session 9Scenario B (negotiated ceasefire) rises to 20% - first structured proposal exchange. Scenario D (wider war) rises to 10% - Houthi entry, Russia active support, Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict. Scenario A (US withdrawal) drops to 35% - Israeli acceleration complicates exit. The war now has a genuine diplomatic track AND a military sabotage track running simultaneously. Which one wins - the R003 question - determines everything.
Per-scenario reasoning
A35%Down from 40%. Israel's acceleration of strikes and Houthi entry complicate a clean exit narrative. Trump still wants out but the war is expanding, not contracting.
C25%Unchanged. 31st MEU in CENTCOM, 160th SOAR at Al Udeid, 82nd deploying. Force posture for limited ground ops achieved. But ceasefire talks may preempt.
B20%Up from 15%. First structured proposal exchange of the war. Pakistan mediation endorsed by China/Kuwait. Both sides submitted formal proposals through intermediaries. But Israel's active sabotage (strikes during negotiations) and the trust deficit remain massive obstacles.
D10%Up from 5%. Houthi entry reopens Yemen axis. Pakistan-Afghanistan war resumed. Russia actively supplying Iran with upgraded drones. The war is no longer contracting.
G5%Down from 10%. Third TACO cycle (deadline extended to Apr 6) makes this increasingly unlikely. The structural constraint (Gulf desalination vulnerability) holds.
E5%Unchanged. Rally-around-flag still holding. IRGC cohesion strong despite Tangsiri killed.
Flash Update 2Reframe, not shift: The old "Grinding attrition" scenario now explicitly includes targeted ground operations as the most likely escalation within that path. No probability mass moved - the scenarios still sum to 100%. The force convergence compresses timelines: 7,000+ troops in theater create a use-it-or-lose-it dynamic. Either the administration authorizes operations, or the forces become a very expensive deterrent that eventually goes home.
Per-scenario reasoning
A40%Unchanged. Trump constructs exit narrative. But a successful Isfahan raid could accelerate this - "we got the uranium" is the ultimate victory declaration.
C25%Reframed. This scenario now includes targeted ground operations (Isfahan raid, possibly Kharg) alongside continued attrition. Force convergence + 160th SOAR deployment make ground ops the most likely form of escalation within this path. If ground ops don't materialize, the war grinds on as before. Unchanged at 25% - ground ops absorbed the old grinding attrition scenario.
B15%Unchanged. Mediators active. The threat of ground operations could either accelerate negotiation (Iran's incentive to settle before troops land) or kill it (invasion signals make Iran refuse to negotiate under duress).
G10%Unchanged. Trump TACOed. Gulf desalination vulnerability killed this path.
D5%Unchanged. Houthis out. Gulf states absorbing.
E5%Unchanged. Rally-around-flag holds. IRGC cohesion strong. A successful Isfahan raid could humiliate the regime but unlikely to trigger collapse alone.
Session 8"Infrastructure war spiral" (G) drops from 25% to 10% on the TACO outcome and Gulf vulnerability constraint. That probability mass moves to "US-imposed halt" (A, up to 40%) and "Negotiated ceasefire" (B, up to 15%). The war is trending toward ending, not escalating - but the ending leaves every strategic problem unresolved. Hormuz stays closed for months. Isfahan uranium survives. Iran's nuclear motivation is strengthened. Israel is stuck in Lebanon. The "victory" will be declared, not achieved.
Per-scenario reasoning
A40%Trump declares victory, draws down. TACO pattern + "productive talks" + congressional funding resistance = exit narrative being constructed. Up from 30%.
C25%Neither decisive victory nor collapse. Reduced strikes, proxy attacks, Hormuz contested. Israel committed in Lebanon. No resolution for months.
B15%Mediators active (Oman, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt). Back-channels functioning. Trump needs an exit story. Up from 10%.
G10%Down sharply from 25%. Trump TACOed on the trigger event. Gulf states too vulnerable to support civilian infrastructure targeting. The structural constraint held.
D5%Houthis out. Gulf states absorbing. Mediators containing. Unchanged.
E5%82,000+ buildings damaged but rally-around-flag holds. IRGC cohesion strong. Unchanged.
Flash Update 1"Regional expansion" (D) dropped from 20% to 5% on the Houthi reassessment. That probability mass moved into the new "Infrastructure war spiral" (G) scenario at 25%, reflecting the power plant ultimatum and the tit-for-tat pattern. The war is less likely to spread geographically but more likely to intensify within the current theater.
Per-scenario reasoning
A30%Trump declares victory, draws down. No ceasefire. Hormuz contested. Iran claims survival. "Winding down" rhetoric suggests desire, but ultimatum contradicts it. Down from 35%.
C25%Neither decisive victory nor collapse. Reduced strikes, proxy attacks, Hormuz contested. Oil elevated. No resolution for months. Zamir says "halfway" - this is what halfway looks like.
G25%NEW. Power plants, energy infrastructure, water systems targeted by both sides. Civilian suffering escalates dramatically. No military resolution, just mutual destruction of critical systems. The ultimatum's logical endpoint.
B10%Third-party mediation. Requires both sides claiming victory. Down from 15% - the nuclear tit-for-tat and ultimatum make diplomatic off-ramps harder to find.
D5%Dramatically reduced from 20%. Houthis sitting out removes the primary expansion vector. Gulf states are absorbing hits but not escalating to full belligerent status. Europe is issuing statements.
E5%Internal fractures topple Islamic Republic. Historically rare from bombing alone. Mojtaba has consolidated. Unchanged.
Session 7Taxonomy change: Scenario F (Protracted conflict) was absorbed into a redefined Scenario C (now "Grinding attrition" rather than "Ground war"). The probability mass didn’t disappear - C’s jump from 6% to 25% reflects F’s 35% being merged in and reweighted alongside the original C. Scenario A surges to 35% as the dominant outcome for the first time, driven by Trump’s exit rhetoric and Iran’s declining conventional capability.
Per-scenario reasoning
A35%US declares objectives met, draws down air campaign. No formal ceasefire. Hormuz remains contested. Iran claims survival as victory.
C25%Neither decisive victory nor collapse. Ongoing reduced strikes, proxy attacks, Hormuz contested. Oil elevated. No political resolution for months.
D20%Houthis activate, Gulf states drawn in as combatants, or NATO member involved. Multi-front regional conflagration. The nightmare scenario.
B15%Third-party mediation (Oman, China, EU) brokers a deal. Requires both sides claiming they "won." Trust is near zero after attacking during negotiations.
E5%Internal fractures, IRGC power struggle, or popular uprising topple the Islamic Republic. Historically rare from bombing alone. Could produce chaos worse than the current regime.
Session 6Protracted conflict ticks back to 35% as the gap between Trump's withdrawal rhetoric and operational reality widens - you cannot wind down a war while requesting $200B and deploying amphibious groups. 'Mission Accomplished' drops to 18% because Iran's willingness to hit Haifa demonstrates they will not quietly absorb strikes and let Trump claim a clean win. Negotiated ceasefire rises modestly on the KH pause and Nowruz/Eid diplomatic window.
Per-scenario reasoning
F35%Trump's 'winding down' rhetoric contradicted by $200B request and Boxer deployment. No clean exit forming - protracted strikes and energy disruption remain most likely.
D22%Houthis reconsidering naval blockade, Iran hitting Haifa refinery and Mina Al-Ahmadi consecutively, and Al-Aqsa closure keep wider war probable.
A18%Trump clearly wants this narrative but the energy war he cannot control denies him the stable backdrop for a credible victory declaration.
B12%Nowruz/Eid and KH's 5-day embassy attack suspension create a thin diplomatic opening, though no framework exists yet.
E7%Evin on bread and water, executions of dissidents could seed fractures, but Mojtaba's consolidation holds and external pressure historically unifies Iranians.
C6%Trump ruled out ground troops, but Netanyahu's 'ground component' rhetoric and Hormuz clearance logic keep this from falling further.
Session 5The energy war going mutual is the dominant shift. Israel's unilateral South Pars strike and Iran's Ras Laffan retaliation fundamentally changed the conflict's character. Regional war surges 5 points because the war now directly damages third-party states. 'Mission Accomplished' drops as the energy escalation denies Washington a clean off-ramp. Protracted conflict dips because the energy tit-for-tat increases probability of a decisive break rather than indefinite stalemate.
Per-scenario reasoning
F33%Energy tit-for-tat, Iraq militia theater, and contested Hormuz point toward grinding conflict, though energy war creates potential for decisive break.
D23%Surges: Iran striking Ras Laffan (CENTCOM's forward HQ host), Israel acting unilaterally on South Pars, and Iraqi militia escalation widen the war's aperture.
A20%Iran's conventional capability nearly destroyed, but the energy war and Iraq theater complicate any clean declaration of victory.
B10%Qatar - the most plausible mediator - just lost $20B/yr in LNG revenue to an Iranian strike, poisoning the diplomatic well.
E8%South Pars destruction accelerates civilian pain, but Mojtaba's consolidation and rally-around-flag from energy strikes work against collapse.
C6%Iraq militia attacks could generate pressure for ground action, but the administration has no appetite and the Iraqi theater is not Iranian soil.
Session 4Divergence between military and strategic outcomes: Iran is being physically dismantled (missiles down 90%, navy gone) yet Hormuz is still closed, oil above $100, and US casualties accumulating. Regional war ticks up on the Bahrain airport strike and Turkey NATO incident. Regime collapse dips as Mojtaba's succession and public address suggest the system is holding under pressure.
Per-scenario reasoning
F35%Iran's conventional capability collapsing but Mojtaba's Hormuz vow and drone/asymmetric persistence mean no clean endpoint in sight.
A25%Missile/air defense destruction gives Washington material for victory narrative, but Hormuz closure and rising US casualties complicate early off-ramp.
D18%Ticks up: Bahrain airport strike, NATO air defenses triggered in Turkey, 14 nations embroiled show horizontal escalation pressure is real.
B10%UK/Germany/Italy Hormuz diplomacy is nascent; Mojtaba's public vow to keep the strait closed forecloses near-term talks.
E7%Mojtaba's consolidation and first public address project internal cohesion; no visible fractures despite devastating attrition.
C5%No political appetite for ground forces; air campaign attrition is working on its own terms.
Session 3Mojtaba's consolidation simultaneously stabilizes Iran (reducing E) while giving the US an off-ramp narrative - Khamenei is dead, the successor is a 'lightweight,' declare mission accomplished. The $119 oil spike and 6,668 civilian units targeted create real pressure on Washington to wind down. Confirmed Houthi non-entry continues to deflate regional war probability.
Per-scenario reasoning
F35%Mojtaba's consolidation means Iran has a functioning command structure and won't collapse quickly, but can't escalate effectively. Grinding stalemate remains modal.
A25%Rises: civilian toll and $119 oil spike increase pressure on US to declare victory. Mojtaba's election gives a face-saving narrative.
D15%Drops: Houthis confirmed out, axis-of-resistance multi-front doctrine is dead, Hezbollah pinned in Lebanon.
B10%Mojtaba's consolidation is a prerequisite for negotiation, but he has zero incentive to negotiate from weakness this early.
E10%Mojtaba's rapid election and IRGC/Basij pledges reduce near-term collapse risk despite cities becoming ghost towns.
C5%Nothing suggests ground invasion. Israel committed to Lebanon. US has no political appetite for a land war.
Session 2The dominant shift is toward protracted conflict and early US withdrawal as the two most likely outcomes. Iran's missile expenditure rate indicates stockpile conservation, the Houthis failed to open a military front, and Israel committed ground forces to Lebanon rather than Iran. The wider regional war scenario loses probability because the actors who would have widened it - Houthis, Gulf states - are staying out.
Per-scenario reasoning
F35%Protracted conflict becomes more likely as Iran's declining missile rate suggests inability to force a decisive outcome, while US/Israel lack ground forces to finish the job.
D20%Drops slightly: Houthis' non-intervention is a major negative indicator for multi-front doctrine, and Lebanon is contained as an Israeli operation.
A20%Rises: Iranian missile depletion and Houthi inaction create a plausible off-ramp where the US declares targets destroyed and draws down.
B10%China's gatekeeper role at Hormuz creates a potential mediator, but no diplomatic channel is visible yet.
E10%Mojtaba survived and the IRGC command structure appears functional - bombing alone rarely collapses states.
C5%Israel's ground forces committed to Lebanon, US has no staging infrastructure, air campaign attrition reduces rationale for invasion.
Session 1Per-scenario reasoning
F30%Neither decisive victory nor collapse. Ongoing strikes, contested Hormuz, proxy attacks. No political resolution. The default if nothing decisive happens.
D25%Hezbollah, Houthis, Gulf states drawn in. Multi-front conflagration. Already 6+ countries hit on Day 3.
A15%US declares objectives met, draws down. No formal ceasefire. Iran claims survival as victory. Hormuz remains contested.
E10%Internal fractures topple the Islamic Republic. Historically rare from bombing alone. IRGC military rule most likely successor - possibly worse.
B10%Third-party mediation produces a halt. Requires trust that does not exist after attacking during active negotiations.
C10%US introduces ground forces into Iran. No staging indicators. Political appetite near zero for a country 3.5x the size of Iraq.